This article explores what the financial crisis shows about changes in the German and French banking systems, the two largest in continental Europe. In particular, we highlight processes of financialization -defined here as the increased trading of risk.
Introduction
Recent record losses in complex financial instruments have seriously weakened many large German banks and brought several near to collapse. French bank losses are 2 lower, but still significant. As of August 2008, twelve German and six French banks had writedowns of more than $1 billion, totalling US$55.9 billion for these German banks and US$23.3 billion for the French . 1 In both countries, banks previously known largely for domestic retail and commercial lending -notably largely Land government-owned German Landesbanken (LB) and French mutual banks -have revealed major losses across a range of activities. This article explores what the crisis shows about any transformation of the German and French banking systems, the two largest in continental Europe. In particular, we highlight processes of financialization -defined here as the increased trading of risk. We focus on an apparent contradiction: Why did the more protectionist and conservative German banking system suffer much higher losses than the more liberalised French system?
This article also examines the responses of German and French banks and governments to the crisis and speculates how far these responses might limit future financialization and shape national banking systems.
Financialization is defined here as the increased trading of, and exposure to, risk. The term is defined in a variety of ways in the IPE literature (see Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005) . The usage here is closest to Aglietta and Breton (2001, p.437) , although financialization is not a term they employ. They link the change from a bank-based to a more market-based financial system to financial liberalisation and financial innovation linked to technological advance. They and also recognise how banks add a 'new market portfolio' to their 'traditional credit portfolio ' (2001, p.441) . The increasing importance of 'market' relative to 'credit' portfolios, and the implications for the nature of 'investment banking' activity at French and German universal banks, is central to our analysis. Financialization almost always in practice involves 3 internationalisation and, always, the reverse. We understand the financialization of banks here in terms of a range of activities, from increasing retail activities internationally (a relatively low exposure to risk, depending on the host country) to derivatives trading and investment in complex securities.
The German and French financial systems both contain a growing number of nonbank financial institutions, but banks still dominate. German depository institutions held 78.3 percent of total assets in December 2002, only a marginal increase since the 1980s. In France, there was a more significant relative decline over the previous decade, but, in December 2003, depository institutions held 64 per cent of financial institution assets (IMF, 2004) . The financialization of German and French banking systems, rather than increasing activity by other financial market actors, is the more important change in the two countries' financial systems over the past two decades, especially, as we discuss below, in the years immediately before the crisis.
We highlight, across all German and French banks, but to significantly varying degrees, the increased importance of both internationalisation and trading activities in the 2000s. The significance of this for possible change in the banking system in Germany and France lies in the nature of banking activities, and therefore the potential sources of future profitability. The debate about the reality, nature, determinants and pace of change in German banking is of long standing (e.g., Deeg, 1999; Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004) . Our engagement with this debate is narrow,
following Hackenthal (2004) in considering changes in the activities of the banks themselves through examination of bank balance sheets. We compare the German and French banks, showing that the former are at least as, if not more, financialised.
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Shifts in national banking systems because of financialization have potential implications for German and French models of capitalism, especially the German system, where 'patient' bank-provided capital has been a core element. In particular, the fact that the activities of banks have precipitated a 'credit crunch' in a number of countries, whereby companies are having difficulty borrowing, demonstrates the significance of recent developments to a varieties of financial capitalism literature that focuses in large part on how companies finance themselves. While the broader implications of such change are beyond the scope of this article, we discuss this briefly in the conclusion.
I. Banking systems in the early 2000s
Although both systems underwent financialization in the 1980s and 90s, this process accelerated rapidly from 2002 to 2007. The German model is traditionally described as a three pillar decentralised universal bank-based financial system (Zysman, 1983; Deeg, 1999) with large private banks, the public sector savings banks (Sparkassen and regional LB) and the cooperatives. The three pillars were (are) separated by financial structures, legal status and governance systems. There is a long (though declining) tradition of Länder government interference in LB lending decisions and overall public sector ownership far exceeds that in comparable economies (IMF, 2003) . In the 1990s, four-fifths of retail and commercial banking activity in Germany was by public sector banks, which were seen as specialising in banking for the Mittelstand, Germany's Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. The listed commercial sector has long been dominated by three large, internationally present universal banks (Deutsche, Dresdner and Commerzbank). Deeg (1999) (Bertero, 1994; O'Sullivan, 2007) , as France moved from a financial network to a financial market form of capitalism (Morin, 1998 (Morin, , 2000 . The importance of bank finance for French companies declined dramatically, and large
French banks compensated by developing investment banking, as in Germany.
However, the comparative strength of French banking was in domestic retail banking, and reduced profit also encouraged the largest French banks to expand retail activities abroad. This strong retail component to internationalisation is in marked contrast to the German banks, whose internationalisation was almost exclusively in corporate lending and investment banking, their traditional areas of expertise. The contrast is 6 highly significant to the differential impact of the crisis in the two countries, and is in large part explained by the historical fragmentation of the German system. (Hackenthal, 2004, p.77 Two important points emerge from these developments. First, investment banking was developed and expanded both by those banks with (increasingly foreign) private shareholders and those without. By the mid 2000s, the French mutual banks were largely indistinguishable in the range of their operations from the large commercial banks. German LB, with their large public shareholders, were also keen to increase profits. The LB may be 'not strictly profit-maximising entities' (Hackenthal, 2004, p.74) , but this had no significant impact on their behaviour in this regard. Second, the nature of what can be broadly seen as 'investment' banking changed over time. The initial impetus for the expansion into overseas investment banking may have been to acquire skills to assist in serving domestic clients (on Germany, Deeg, 1999) . The foreign firms purchased were largely advisory fee-earning, not proprietary trading, businesses, but over time, as will be discussed in greater detail below, proprietary trading increasingly dominated investment banking..
II. Financialization and the Credit Crisis
We analyse below the reports and accounts of the main French and German banks. We reach three conclusions from the data. First, trading activity has increased significantly, especially by the German banks, but also the French. In particular, the use of derivatives in trading activities has increased very significantly, especially in Germany. Derivatives are used to reduce the risks from both credit (e.g., Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004, p.510) and interest rate mismatches (Memmel and Schertler, 2009 ), but in most banks analysed the volume of derivatives traded massively exceeds that required for balance sheet and financing risk hedging. Nearly all banks that distinguish classify derivatives transactions as mainly for trading purposes. Second, however, there is no correlation between the use of derivatives and impact of announced losses. Some of the greatest victims of the crisis, such as Bayerische Landesbank, Industrie Kredietbank (IKB) and Landesbank Sachsen, were not especially heavy traders of derivatives, but appear to have been engaged in activities that were not enormously profitable but were perceived as safe, notably investment in AAA-rated Asset Backed Securities and the contingent risks involved in AssetBacked Commercial Paper and SIVs 2 (see Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, p.24) . This was 'disaster myopia' (Guttentag and Herring, 1986) . Third, French banks were engaged in many of the same activities as German banks and made substantial, but smaller, losses. While those banks that suffered less were perhaps 'better traders', the main difference is one of degree rather than different practices. Most obviously, French banks were far smaller investors in the assets that became toxic, and less involved in setting up off balance sheet vehicles. In addition, the large retail banking businesses of the French banks lessened the overall impact of the crisis.
Changing Bank Activities Prior to the Crisis: Trading Activity
The banks' reports do not give a single way to track increased trading activity, but the data all point in the same direction. The available data includes the percentage of total assets designated 'trading assets', or, more narrowly, the proportion of securities held for trading purposes. Examination of the asset side of the balance sheet, however, also demonstrates an increased vulnerability to market movements. It has been frequently suggested that
German banking is moving more in the direction of an Anglo-Saxon model. These data suggest that in the years leading up to the crisis, the trajectory of that change steepened. For a period, this was a successful strategy. Risk-adjusted trading results at the largest banks were seen as improving from 2005 until mid-2007. However, after that, heavy losses were made (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, p.67) .
French banks overall are not as heavily involved in trading, relative to total assets that included substantial retail operations; nor have they generally experienced the marked increase in this activity in Germany. The one exception is BNP Paribas but, even here, derivatives activity declined relative to total assets, and notional derivatives volume in 2008 was 39 percent lower than Deutsche Bank. Elsewhere, however, the picture is different. Société Générale (which made heavy losses in derivatives trading) has lower trading assets, and derivatives activity relative to total assets closer to Commerzbank, and less than a third of Deutsche. Crédit Agricole is comparable to both WestLB and DZ Bank. The problems at Natixis were serious, but trading assets at Caisse d'Epargne are low (although derivatives activity is higher than most LB).
Crédit Mutuel has similarly low trading assets, and derivatives activity fell well before the crisis. While the French mutuals have become universal banks, they remain Générale, but the expansion was at least as much in the area of international retail banking as trading activity.
Internationalisation
German bank internationalisation also demonstrates rapid change in recent years. The nature of internationalisation is somewhat obscured by the presentation in some financial reports, particularly not separating Germany from the rest of Western Europe. We focus on credit exposure (contained generally in the risk reports in the annual reports) rather than revenue, because revenue is generally categorised by the 13 geographic entity where a risk is actually recorded. LB Sachsen's US sub-prime exposure, for example, was largely incurred by a Dublin-based subsidiary.
The available data support two observations. First, internationalisation on the asset side of the balance sheet has been very significant, and has accelerated in recent years.
Second, although European financial integration should be expected to result in increased euro area exposure outside the home market,, the increase in exposure outside Europe, particularly in North America, is at least as significant as any increase in lending in the euro area.4 The available data is set out in Table 2 .
<Insert Table 2 here>
Amongst the large private banks, data limitations prevent a full comparison. Again, the most dramatic changes are at the LB (despite considerable diversity).
Lending to their home Land cannot be isolated, except for the probably anomalous LB Sachsen, 5 but the available figures demonstrate significantly increased internationalisation. The process of internationalisation Deeg (1999) highlights has continued at an accelerating rate. These figures are, once again, difficult to reconcile with the view of LB as prioritising the needs of a home region. They are also hard, along with so many of the activities highlighted here, to reconcile with LB as 'not strictly profit-maximising entities' (Hackenthal, 2004, p.74) . The absence of private shareholder pressure did not prevent, for example, LB Sachsen in 2003 setting a target for return on equity higher than was then being achieved by Deutsche Bank (Kirchfeld and Simmons, 2008) .There is also no reason to see French mutual banks as not profit maximising, but they remain overwhelmingly domestic institutions.
This analysis shows that the view of the German banks as more conservative, as befits a bank-based financial system, does not hold. German banks are at least as financialised as, if not more financialised than, French banks operating in what is generally seen as now a deregulated, more market-based system. The high leverage of German banks is well-documented, and the gap between leverage and regulatory capital requirements is high, thanks to the favourable treatment of many highly-rated assets and derivatives positions (IMF, 2009, p.14) . This has in itself created vulnerabilities in the current crisis. However, the analysis above takes this further.
The banks have also been more heavily involved in trading rather than lending, and significantly more internationalised. There has been a global trend in investment banking towards proprietary trading, but that the LB are,in this sense, 'the same as everyone else', in itself challenges the traditional perception of them.
We have so far concentrated on changes in the banks' activities as shown in the banks' balance sheets. However, the financial crisis reveals that many risks taken have been either largely hidden on the balance sheet or were off balance sheets altogether. In this area, differences between French and German banks are also marked.
Analysing the Banks' Losses
Recent European bank losses offer an unusual opportunity to examine the nature of banking. The crisis has obviously been an enormous surprise, but that 'traditionally conservative' German banks have made around a quarter of Europe's writedowns (IMF, 2009,p.12) has been a further shock. Table 3 it also has the potential to bring about substantial change.
<Insert Table 3 here>
The crisis has not hit the largest or most sophisticated banks hardest. The most severely affected, Hypo Real Estate, IKB and LB Sachsen (all of whom effectively collapsed) are relatively small, and, measured by their activity in the derivatives market, less involved in the trading of the most sophisticated products. HRE is possibly an individual case, because so many of its problems stem from the funding of Depfa Bank, but the other two suffered losses mainly from their ABCP and SIVs (see Deutsche Bundesbank, 2007, p.24, 49; Tett, 2009) reduced the overall impact. German banks, meanwhile, were not primarily focused on patient domestic lending, but were in fact more exposed to market movements than their French counterparts. The change in their activities has been even more pronounced than generally recognised.
III. Government Action
Intervention by both governments is unprecedented, propping up ailing banks and boosting confidence in the banking sector; responding with credit guarantees; bailouts through loans; purchasing minority shares or nationalising out-right; coordinated or enforced mergers; conditions on remuneration; tighter regulation and pushing for reinforced regulatory frameworks at the European and international levels (cf the government response to the crisis in the Nordic countries, see Mayes, 2010 The financialization of French banks may have contributed to the unravelling of the cross-shareholding groups created in the 1990s and centred around the three largest banks, but the crucial transformation in France remains the move to a 'financial market' form of capitalism, as large French companies turned to the equity markets for finance and French banks looked abroad and to other activities to compensate (Morin, 1998 (Morin, , 2000 . Financialization has nonetheless potentially undermined the patient capital that underpinned the cross-shareholding groups. At the same time, The French banking system has been relatively little affected by the financial crisis and there is unlikely to be a significant shift either because of the banks' own strategic 27 responses or government intervention. The French system will continue its present trajectory of increased financialization and gradual consolidation. The German banking system seems far more affected and the crisis may accelerate some of the trends already encouraged by financialization -notably LB mergers and the further loosening of regional ties. It remains to be seen whether LB and Länder government opposition will succeed, as in the past, in slowing systemic change.
